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ABSTRACT 
 
Liberalisation has become an increasingly important policy trend, both in the 
private and public sectors of advanced industrial economies. This article eschews 
deterministic accounts of liberalisation by considering why government attempts 
to institute competition may be successful in some cases and not others. It 
considers the relative strength of explanations focusing on the institutional 
context, and on the volume and power of sectoral actors supporting liberalisation. 
These approaches are applied to two attempts to liberalise, one successful and one 
unsuccessful, within one sector in one nation- higher education in Britain. Each 
explanation is seen to have some explanatory power, but none is sufficient to 
explain why competition was generalised in the one case and not the other. The 
paper counsels the need for scholars of liberalisation to be open to multiple 
explanations which may require the marshalling of multiple sources and types of 
evidence.  
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Introduction 
 
Theorists of comparative political economy have become increasingly concerned 
with explaining the mechanisms aiding the spread of economic liberalisation, 
which has become an important current within public policy. The liberalisation of 
British Higher Education is an interesting case to examine. The sector comprises 
a large number of ‘providers’ and ‘consumers’, and has become an increasingly 
important element of the national economy. In addition, not only have Higher 
Education Institutions (HEIs) been the location of much debate concerning the 
advantages and disadvantages of liberalisation, they have also sometimes been 
seen as at the vanguard of promoting it in Britain. For example, , the private 
University of Buckingham contentiously received a Royal Charter, conferring it 
with University status, in the ideologically-polarised early 1980s. It is also of 
contemporary relevance, with a review of British Higher Education funding due 
to report in Autumn 2010 (the ‘Browne Review’) on whether a ‘cap’ on tuition 
fees for domestic undergraduates should be removed, which some have seen as 
consolidating the creation of a ‘market’ in British higher education (Kealey, 
2006).  
 
Restricting the analysis to one sector within one nation prevents those problems 
thrown up by comparative analysis arising from the causal potency of different 
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national and sectoral institutions, organisations and cultures. This paper seeks to 
build on the analysis of Le Galès and Scott, who sought to elucidate ‘the role of 
the state in introducing market mechanisms’ (2010, p.121), by complementing 
their macro-level analysis of institutional change with a sustained and detailed 
sectoral-level analysis.  
 
This paper first examines and defines ‘liberalisation’ within the higher education 
sector. It then describes two cases of attempted liberalisation- the introduction of 
full-cost fees for international students, and the attempted introduction of a 
‘bidding’ system for additional student numbers. In both cases a market 
alternative was offered to participants, yet in only one case was competition 
generalised across the sector and a ‘market’ created. Why might this have been 
the case? The paper moves on to examine three possible explanations. First, that a 
market-favouring ‘logic of action’ must be established before a market can be 
created; secondly, that a ‘threshold’ of competitive behavior must be reached 
before a collective institution ‘tips’ into a market; and finally, that the strategic 
position of different actors within institutions will affect the extent to which a 
market can be created. These explanations differ not only in their focus, but also 
in terms of the nature of evidence required to support them. The article concludes 
by suggesting that theorists of liberalisation should be wary of overly simplistic 
approaches. In this case, all three approaches are relevant, and each may be of use 
more broadly in the analysis of liberalisation across the public sector.  
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This article is based on documentary analysis of the papers of key organisations 
and individuals from the Warwick Modern Records Centre and the Public 
Records Office; statistical information; press reports; and interviews conducted 
with governmental (officials and politicians) and interest group actors between 
2004- 2009. Ten semi-structured interviews were undertaken with individuals 
who had been involved in the two cases, including former politicians, civil 
servants, and representatives of lobbying groups for universities and international 
students. All interviews were anonymised. The interviews were undertaken in 
order to provide context for the documentary material, which at points was rather 
patchy and failed to provide clear information concerning the chronology of the 
policy processes discussed below. The interviews were also used to obtain a 
better understanding of the political context for each case, which again could not 
be ascertained through the documents alone. 
 
Liberalisation in higher education 
 
Liberalisation has been described as one of the most important, if not the most 
important, public policy developments in industrialized political economies since 
the end of the Second World War. Such liberalisation involved a ‘secular 
expansion in market relations’ (Streeck and Thelen, 2005, 2), sometimes also 
coupled with ‘intensified commodification’ (Streeck, 2008; see Slaughter and 
Leslie, 1997, for a discussion in the higher education context). Work on 
liberalisation within the public sector has tended to focus on the specificities of 
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the creation of ‘quasi markets’ (Le Grand, 2007). Quasi-markets combine free 
access at the point of delivery with decentralized market-like competition 
(Bartlett, Roberts and Le Grand, 1998; Le Grand, Propper and Smith, 2008). 
However, in many cases of public sector liberalisation, access is no longer free as 
user charges have been introduced as a means of promoting liberalization, in 
addition to competition between providers.  
 
The scope of this article differs from previous analyses of liberalisation in the 
public sector by identifying liberalisation specifically with the promotion of 
competition. This focus on identifying and explaining the creation of competitive 
relationships helps avoid the confusion which is often engendered by the use of 
other, less precise, terms such as ‘market’. Marginson suggests this arises because 
the term ‘market’ implies a ‘conventional economic market’ which he suggests 
must display a number of rather specific characteristics in order to qualify as such 
(2009, pp.14-5, 3)). In addition, ‘governments and state agencies can set up 
markets, manage markets, own and conduct business activity and generate 
profits’ (Marginson, 2007, 309)- thus muddying distinctions between ‘state’ and 
‘market’ approaches to higher education policy. Marginson (2006) suggests that 
producer (university) competition can be separated from consumer (prospective 
student) competition, and local (domestic) from international (global) 
competition, while Teixeira et al. suggest that a variety of ‘sub-markets’ exist 
with their own competition dynamics, including markets for undergraduate, 
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postgraduate and international students; for academic staff; and for research 
grants, scholarships, and donations (2004, 4).  
 
For the purposes of this paper, competition will be defined, following Boyne et 
al., as ‘a contest between rival producers for a share of a market’ (Boyne et al., 
2003, p.31). Governments can promote this type of competition in a variety of 
ways, from changing ‘basic conditions’- the ‘framework of laws and values 
within which academic institutions operate’, to influencing ‘market structure’, by 
for example ‘freeing’ or ‘simulating markets’, to regulating the ‘conduct of … 
sellers’ (Dill, 1997).   
 
The paper examines two cases where competition was promoted within formerly 
collective institutions. The first concerns the introduction of full-cost fees for 
international students coming from outside the EU- who will be referred to as 
‘international students’ throughout this paper. The second concerns the attempted 
introduction of a ‘bidding’ system for additional domestic students within the 
British Higher Education sector. In doing so, the paper highlights the challenges 
for the public policy theorist in researching liberalisation. In particular, by 
emphasising the role of governments in attempting, and sometimes failing to 
promote, competition, it illustrates the perils of viewing markets in a 
‘disembodied’ manner, as merely ‘shaped by an ‘invisible hand’ or by the rational 
choices of individuals in the ‘marketplace’’, rather than acknowledging the role 
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of governments in both creating and sustaining competition (Marginson and 
Rhoades, 2002, p.297).  
 
 
Explaining the Development of Liberalisation 
 
The first explanation for the differential development of liberalisation in this 
sector stresses the institutional context for change. Wolfgang Streeck and 
Kathleen Thelen have maintained that liberalisation is fostered by the 
development of particular ‘logics of action’ (2005), drawing on Richard Deeg’s 
work. Deeg suggests that institutional paths exhibit identifiable ‘logics’, which 
are ‘distinct pattern[s] of constraints and incentives [which] generate typical 
strategies, routine approaches to problems and shared decision rules that produce 
predictable patterns of behaviour by actors’ (2001, p.14).  
 
The second possible explanation concerns the number of actors supporting 
change. It suggests the need for a ‘threshold’ of competitive behavior to be 
reached before a collective institution ‘tips’ into a market. Such an approach 
would suggest that this threshold was reached in the full-cost fees case and not in 
the bidding case. Pierson’s analysis of path dependence suggests how the degree 
and scope of competition might affect the likelihood of transition into a ‘fully-
fledged’ market (Pierson, 2004). He suggests that stable institutional 
arrangements generate increasing returns to participants. Once a significant 
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proportion of actors have begun participating in competitive behavior, the 
incentives for them to continue this way are strong. Hence, the structural context 
for stable liberalisation, as for the consolidation of other system characteristics 
(O’Toole and Meier, 1999), is crucial.  
 
A third explanation concerns the power of actors supporting change. This 
explanation focuses on the strategic position of those involved in upholding 
particular logics or practices. Here, one could invoke Peter Hall’s stress on power 
relationships as a determining factor in ‘third-order change’, with the ‘supporters’ 
of what he calls a new ‘paradigm’, which could be compared to a new ‘logic’ or 
‘practice’, needing to ‘secure positions of authority…so as to institutionalize the 
new paradigm’ (1993, p.281).  
 
Two Cases of Attempted Liberalisation from British Higher Education 
 
The British higher education sector is currently composed of 165 higher 
education institutions (including universities, colleges, and specialist institutions) 
(UniversitiesUK, 2010). Traditionally, universities were funded through a stable 
and ‘unselective’ flow of grants from central government by what was then 
described as the ‘University Grants Committee’, later renamed the Universities 
Funding Council (Merrison, 1980: 287). From the mid-1970s onwards, as 
discussed below, the provision of such ‘unselective’ block grant funding started 
to diminish (Kogan and Hanney, 2000; Moore, 1987). 
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Although less than many of their continental counterparts, British governments 
have possessed a significant amount of influence in the domestic higher education 
sector. In addition to providing significant amounts of funding to higher 
education institutions, central government also traditionally controlled which 
institutions should benefit from degree-awarding status.   
 
It should be noted that the UK higher education system has been subject to a 
considerable amount of policy change since the case studies described in this 
paper. First of all, since the introduction of the Scotland Act (1998), Govermnent 
of Wales Act (1998), and alterations to the governance of Northern Ireland, these 
component nations of the United Kingdom have been able to set their own 
policies concerning higher education (Clark, 2006). At the time of the two cases 
described here, however, higher education institutions based in the different 
nations of the UK could still reasonably be viewed as part of the same system 
(with all subject to broadly the same funding measures).  
 
Secondly, the role of private financing of higher education has increased 
significantly in England since the introduction of a flat-rate tuition fee of £1,000 
across the UK in 1998 (which was, however, abolished in Scotland in 2000, and 
replaced by an ‘endowment charge’ after graduation). The fee was increased to a 
maximum of £3,000 in 2006, to rise in line with inflation. Most recently, the 
‘Browne Review’ into student support in England, published in October 2010, 
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recommended that tuition fees be increased significantly. This has been accepted 
by government, albeit with a limit on maximum chargeable fees of £9,000, and a 
removal of the block teaching grant for all subjects falling outside ‘STEM’ status 
(Science, Technology, Engineering and Mathematics).  The cases described 
below can help illuminate current developments, not least by highlighting the fact 
that governmental attempts to induce competition in British higher education 
have not always been as successful as initially predicted (Dodds, forthcoming) 
 
The two attempts to introduce competition into higher education examined here 
differed across some respects. International students comprised a relatively small 
proportion of the higher education intake at the beginning of the period. In 
contrast, while the bidding system initially concerned additional student numbers, 
it might have been seen as a ‘Trojan horse’ for government to lower costs across 
the board by signaling the possibility for lower unit costs. In addition, one case 
involved a quasi-market, whereby the transaction occurred between government 
and HEIs, whereas the other was more akin to a full-blown market, whereby the 
transaction occurred between international students and HEIs. Nonetheless, both 
attempts were viewed as opportunities for what one then Education Minister 
described as ‘an opportunity for… radical marketisation’ which the then 
Conservative Government was eager to seize, by introducing competition into the 
sector (Interview with Former Education Minister, 2009). In both cases, 
competitive mechanisms were introduced in tandem with, or as a consequence of, 
attempts to cut costs; in the full-cost fees case, to trim the higher education 
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budget, and in the bidding case, to reduce the unit costs per student. In addition, 
both the new systems marked significant breaks with existing methods of higher 
education funding in the U.K.  
 
The Introduction of Full-Cost Fees for International Students 
 
The decision to introduce full-cost fees for international students was made by the 
UK Department for Education with no consultation with HEIs (Her Majesty’s 
Government, 1979, p.6). Initially, most HEIs suffered a cut in total funding 
following the removal of all public subsidy for international students which 
amounted to around 13-15% of institutional income in the three years up to 1984 
(Kogan and Hanney 2000, p.86). However, by 2003-4, the higher education 
sector as a whole was receiving £1257.8 million in fee revenue from  
international students, after scholarships and other costs had been subtracted 
(Johnes, 2004, p.10). This benefit was, however, very unevenly distributed across 
the sector, and does not appear to have been anticipated by HEIs in 1979, who 
were unable to prevent the introduction of the new system.  
 
The Attempted Introduction of a Bidding System for Additional Students  
 
In contrast, the 1989 attempt to introduce a bidding process, described by 
Catherine Bargh et al. as effectively a ‘full-blown internal market’, failed (Bargh, 
Scott and Smith, 1996, p.17). The system required universities to bid against each 
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other for funded student places. Effectively universities were required to declare 
the price at which they would be willing to take on additional student numbers. 
Those offering the lowest ‘prices’, i.e. with the lowest bids, would then obtain 
greater student numbers. The clear expectation amongst policy-makers was that 
this system would lead to many universities under-bidding the official guideline 
‘price’, since they wanted to attract additional student numbers.  
 
The introduction of the new system was first mooted by Lord Chilver, the newly-
appointed Chairman of the Universities Funding Council (UFC) (THES, 9.6.89). 
The UFC had been created to replace the UGC, which had traditionally been seen 
as a relatively benign ‘buffer’ between universities and government (Salter and 
Tapper, 1994). In contrast, the new UFC, and in particular the businessman Lord 
Chilver, heralded a more accountable and open relationship between the 
universities and government. Lord Chilver promoted a view of universities as 
‘selling, as a service, the teaching of students’, and the development of a ‘price’ 
for educating individual students (Appleyard, 1989a).  
 
In December 1989 proposals were unveiled whereby universities were ‘to be 
thrust into a competitive arena that will see them bid blind against each other for 
most of their undergraduate and postgraduate taught courses’ (THES, 15.12.89). 
The new system applied to all courses except those subject to numerical 
restrictions for workforce planning reasons, such as medicine, dentistry and 
veterinary science.  
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By the summer of 1990 however, the bidding process had been acknowledged as 
a ‘failure’, given ‘that only 8% of the bids [were] below the guide price and 
nearly all of those are only a small amount below’ (see also Bargh et al., 1996, 
p.17; Cave, Dodsworth and Thompson, 1995; Kogan and Hanney, 2000, p.92).  
The UFC maintained that it did not believe ‘that a cartel had been operated, but 
[suggested that] there had been suspicions [of this] in some quarters’ (CVCP, 
1990, p.3; Shattock, 2008). Bidding came to be described as only one method of 
introducing competition (UFC, 19.12.90, p.3), which could not be countenanced 
again for fear of a ‘second failure’ (UFC, 8.1.91, p.4).  
 
Why was competition generalised in the case of full-cost fees for international 
students, and not in this case of the introduction of bidding for additional student 
numbers? The remainder of the article attempts to assess the three proposed 
explanations. 
 
Explaining Competition: New ‘Logics of Action’? 
 
The first approach to be examined here suggests that institutions embody 
particular ‘logics of action’, and that new logics must therefore be created if 
institutions are to change in any significant manner.  ‘Institutional logics’ can be 
defined as a ‘set of material practices and symbolic constructions’ used by 
organisations as guidelines for behavior (Friedland and Alford, 1991, p.248; see 
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also Thornton, Jones and Kury, 2005; DiMaggio, 1991; Mullins, 2006; Scott, 
Ruef, Mendel and Caronna, 2000).  
 
‘Institutional logics’ thus comprise certain institutional factors, including their 
less formal elements- i.e., institutional logics are constituted by certain elements 
of institutions, rather than resulting from them. For the limited purposes of this 
article, ‘logics of action’ will be defined as those patterns of behaviour which 
follow from the creation and implementation of particular rules. Hence, a market 
institution would constitute those sets of rules which govern economic 
interactions (Davis and Holt, 1993, p.33), by promoting competition between 
actors. The institutional ‘logic’ in this case would comprise the patterns of 
behaviour- the types of economic and social interactions, for example- which are 
structured by these sets of rules.  
 
The rules constituting particular institutions may contradict each other, and may 
be more, or less, formalised or explicitly codified. Institutions may, therefore, 
comprise of ideational elements such as cultural norms, which shape behaviour, 
as well as of more formal elements, such as codified regulations. Such cultural 
norms may be tacit rather than explicit- thus differentiating them from formal 
systems of ‘ideology’. As previously explained, however, ‘institutional logics’ 
refer to those patterns of behaviour which these formal or informal rules promote, 
rather than to the institutional elements themselves. The following discussion 
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focuses mainly on the impact of formal, rather than informal, rules on 
institutional logics. 
 
It is necessary to examine the rules created and implemented by government and 
the UFC in the full-cost fees case and in the bidding case, and consider the ‘logics 
of action’ which these promoted. In the full-cost fees case, government removed 
any possibility of extracting revenue from international students unless HEIs 
charged them above a certain minimum fee. In 1993-4 (Back, Davis and Olsen, 
1997), the market was deregulated with the removal of this minimum fee. It is 
arguable that by rendering the status quo financially impossible for universities, 
government promoted a ‘logic’ of seeking out additional funds from international 
students (Cave et al., 1995, 93).  
 
It would, however, have been possible for universities to continue to charge just 
the minimum fee for international students, thus operating the type of ‘price-
fixing cartel’ which they were accused of using to disrupt the bidding system. 
Yet, rather than clustering around the minimum fee, universities quickly moved 
to charge higher fees. It is arguable that this occurred because the minimum fee 
was set at a relatively low level, which failed to cover the costs of most courses 
(THES, 8.6.90). This led to a proliferation of different fee levels being charged, 
with universities competing for custom.  
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It is difficult to maintain that the use of particular types of rules was responsible 
for the failure to create a market in the bidding case, given the absence of a 
‘control’ governed by different rules. Nonetheless, a number of contemporary 
observers suggested that the creation of a ‘guide price’ during the bidding process 
led inexorably to the failure to institute a market for additional student numbers.  
 
Initially the UFC appeared unsure about whether or not to offer universities 
‘guide prices’ (UFC, 1.6.89, p.2) or ‘bidding benchmarks’ (Appleyard, 1989b, p.  
2). Initially at least, the process of price formation for this auction was confused 
rather than explicit as is usually the case for auctions, with ‘the rules that 
determine the final price… usually well-understood by all parties involved’ 
(Menezes and Monteiro, 2004, p.9). In January 1990 however, the UFC finally 
published a set of guide prices, which represented ‘the maximum amount the 
funding council [was] prepared to pay for teaching per student per year’ in twenty 
different academic subject groups (THES, 5.1.90).  
 
The Times Higher lead article following the failure of the bidding process, 
maintained that: 
 
‘…it was the UFC and not the universities which established the 
conditions for a price-cartel. […] Once those prices had been 
published- and in many cases objected to by subject 
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associations as too low- it became difficult for any universities 
to make bids that were systematically lower’ (THES, 29.6.90).  
 
Andrew Whitford (1997) has described how the particular rules created by 
governments for bidding systems and auctions can affect outcomes. Such rules 
include the setting of ‘floors’, ‘ceilings’, or ‘reserve prices’. The temptation to 
specify such maxima and minima is strong, given the desire of governments to 
exercise at least some control over competitive funding systems. Indeed, in the 
absence of maxima or minima, the credibility of a bidding system can be 
undermined, as actors will not necessarily trust governments not to intervene if 
‘unacceptably’ low or high bids are put forward. However, the presence of 
maxima or minima can steer actors towards a particular bid value.  
 
This is perhaps especially the case where ‘bid-makers’ are accountable not just to 
‘bid-takers’ but also to other constituencies. Vice-Chancellors, as ‘bid-makers’, 
had to offer bids to the UFC, but were also in theory accountable to the staff of 
their universities. Putting forward bids below the guide price would inevitably 
send a message to staff about how much, or more to the point, how little, their 
work educating extra students was valued by management. By setting a realistic, 
albeit ‘challenging’, guide price, the UFC perhaps unwittingly reduced the room 
for Vice-Chancellors to offer lower bid prices and thus compete against each 
other. Although in the vast majority of cases identical bids were offered, which 
would generally be classified as constituting a cartel (Comanor and Schankerman, 
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1976), such an outcome was perhaps inevitable given the ‘logic of action’ 
promoted by the guide price system.  
 
However, this conclusion in some respects appears to be contradicted by the case 
of full-cost fees for international students, since a type of ‘guide price’ was set 
(the ‘minimum fee’), and was only used by universities as a basis for setting 
prices for a very short period of time, with fees varying widely between 
universities after complete deregulation. One assumes that universities would 
have been equally constrained by staff not to lower international students’ fees 
below the previous minima- but some HEIs did.  
 
It is interesting to consider the informational differences between the two cases. 
The bidding case involved what could be described as a sealed-bid auction, often 
seen as the most profitable type of auction where risk-averse bidders are involved  
(Klemperer, 2004, 2). HEIs might reasonably have been concerned not to differ 
too substantially from the status quo given a lack of information about other 
HEIs’ bids. However, there appears to have been considerable ad hoc sharing of 
information between HEIs, given the accusations of a price-fixing ‘cartel’ 
(Shattock, 2008).  
 
In addition, it is arguable that HEIs operated in similarly ‘information poor’ 
environments, at least initially, when setting their prices for international students 
following the deregulation of international students’ fees. Interviewees suggested 
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that the process of fee-setting did not, generally, follow a meticulous survey of 
other HEIs’ fees, but occurred on a rather ad-hoc basis, with HEIs having little 
idea of the real ‘market value’ of their courses (Interviews with HEI employees 
and British Council employee, 2004-5).  
 
As a result, it is arguable that HEIs were ‘information poor’ in both cases, as well 
as being subject to similar sets of rules to promote the introduction of 
competition, i.e. to similar ‘logics of action’. The creation of an appropriate ‘logic 
of action’ might therefore be seen as potentially necessary for the engendering of 
widespread competition, but not sufficient for this to be generalised across a 
sector.  
 
It might also be argued that the institutional context in each case created different 
sets of incentives for participation in the new systems. In particular, it could be 
argued that one proposal (the bidding system) necessarily involved a reduction in 
funds going to the higher education sector, whilst the other (the introduction of 
full-cost fees) potentially signified an increase in funds. If so, the ‘self-interest’ of 
HEIs would naturally lead them to support the new fees, but not the bidding 
system. This argument can, however, be contested.  As previously mentioned, in 
both cases, the measures were introduced specifically in order to reduce 
governmental financial commitments in higher education- to either reduce unit 
costs (the bidding case) or to remove government contributions to the cost of 
international students’ education (the full-cost fees case). If HEIs truly anticipated 
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making substantial gains from attracting high numbers of international students 
through the new fees regime, it is surprising that so many criticised the proposals 
when they were first promoted. Indeed, as Williams notes, a “good part of the 
opposition to the overseas student policy came from Vice-Chancellors and 
principals who could not see how their institutions were to remain solvent when 
faced with a withdrawal of part of their grants” (Williams, 1981, p.225)- rather 
than viewing the new fees as a potential new source of revenue. Hence, ‘self-
regarding reasons’ (Streeck and Thelen, 2005, p.33) (i.e. the prospect of 
additional funds, or conversely of cuts in funds, following the introduction of 
more competition) appear insufficient to explain the differences between the two 
cases.   
 
Explaining Competition: Crossing Thresholds? 
 
A number of public policy accounts have suggested that incremental changes can 
build up over a considerable period of time without substantial effects, until a 
‘threshold’ is reached and significant institutional change then occurs (Cashore 
and Howlett, 2007). This notion has also been an important element of 
Baumgartner and Jones’ (1993) model of ‘punctuated equilibrium’, alongside 
other concepts such as venue shifting and agenda-shaping (for a review, see John 
2006). It has also informed analyses of the spread of liberalisation across nations 
(Simmons and Elkins, 2004) and within the EU (Levi-Faur, 2003).   
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The concept of a ‘threshold’ seems to suggest that quantitative factors can play an 
important role, with change being cumulative and linear. What can we learn from 
the proportions of HEIs which decided to participate in competition in each case?   
 
In the bidding case, a majority of institutions underbid on at least some subjects, 
with 21 universities underbidding the guide price by at least ten percent for at 
least some subjects, 11 underbidding the guide price by between five percent and 
ten percent, and ten underbidding by up to five percent (UFC, 12.9.90). The low 
number of universities which underbid did appear to prevent the 
institutionalisation of the bidding system. So, perhaps policy-makers had some 
type of threshold in mind, although this was never explicitly stated.  
 
It is more difficult to assess whether thresholds were relevant in the case of the 
introduction of full-cost fees. Only one university (Manchester) subverted the 
system by allowing international students an extended deadline for payment of 
full-cost fees. While many HEIs claimed that some of their courses were only 
viable due to the attendance of international students (Education, Science and 
Arts Committee, 1980, 127-8), none followed Manchester’s lead.  
 
By 1981-2, the average fee level per international student was varying by up to 
£1,100 for those students who had started their courses the previous year 
(Committee of Public Accounts, 1982, 41). This variation became more 
significant following the removal of the ‘minimum fee’ in 1993.  
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This comparison might suggest that whilst a ‘tipping point’ was reached in the 
full-cost fees example, it was not in the ‘bidding’ example. The problem however 
with arguing that quantitative thresholds constitute ‘tipping points’ for 
generalising competition relates to the argument’s reliance on counterfactuals. 
Because ‘thresholds are behavioural dispositions, they are difficult to measure 
with confidence before the behaviour actually occurs’ (Granovetter, 1978, 
p.1440). A certain ‘value’ could be described as a threshold, beyond which a 
market would be deemed to have been created, and below which a market would 
not have been created. For example, one might posit that eight percent of bids 
would have needed to be below the guide price for a competitive bidding system 
to have been instituted; and that this was why, with just seven percent of bids 
coming in under the guide price, the bidding process failed and a market was not 
instituted. Similarly, it could be argued that if more than one university had acted 
as Manchester had- say, if ten rather than one universities had tried to subvert the 
system- the full-cost fees system would have failed.  
 
However, such an argument would need the backing of at least one out of two 
types of evidence concerning the ‘aggregation process’ involved in decision-
making relating to the generalisation of competition (ibid., 1428). First, one 
could, hypothetically, provide evidence that policymakers themselves held to a 
certain psychological threshold, beyond which they would publicly proclaim that 
a ‘market’ had been created. This would be to create institutions by semantic fiat 
- but need not necessarily be rejected out of hand.  
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Secondly, one could, hypothetically, provide proof of either, in the full-cost fees 
case, a previous unsuccessful attempt at instituting fees competition, with fewer 
HEIs participating than in the case examined, or, in the bidding case, a previous 
or subsequent successful attempt at instituting bidding competition, with more 
HEIs participating than in the case examined. Hence, while the concept of 
thresholds appears to have some intuitive purchase on the case at hand, in the 
absence of further evidence it offers only a partial, and rather weak, explanation 
of the difference between the two cases.   
 
Explaining Competition: Strategic Position? 
 
The final explanation comes from Paul Pierson’s qualification of the importance 
of thresholds in his discussions of path dependence (2004). Pierson suggests that 
not only must quantitative thresholds sometimes be passed for institutional 
change to occur; qualitative factors can also be important. In particular, he notes 
the importance of large groups’ decisions to participate in new institutions as a 
factor which can help us to understand change. Rather than simply the ‘size of 
groups, alone’ explaining institutional change or stability (Howlett and Rayner, 
2006, 11), the particular power and influence wielded by those actors who decide 
to participate in markets, or otherwise, should be examined. This approach 
parallels work in science and technology studies which has examined ‘tipping 
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points’ in the adoption of innovations, referring to the strategic position of early 
adopters (Gladwell, 2000).  
 
We can ask, therefore, which HEIs decided to participate in the market for 
international students, and which in that for extra students in the bidding system. 
Were participating HEIs traditionally ‘powerful’ or influential universities, or 
younger or smaller universities which might be expected to have less strategic 
influence?  
 
The market for international students has had ‘winners’ and relative ‘losers’. 
Examining the fee levels and numbers of international students at forty-six pre-
1992 universities from 1980-1981 until 2001-2002, confirms this (see below).  
[Table 1 here] 
 
The numbers of international students attending particular HEIs has changed 
greatly from 1979 to 2002. Initially, the distribution of international students 
attending different HEIs appeared to converge but by 1982-3 there was increasing 
divergence between HEIs, with the difference between HEIs’ intakes of 
international students increasing year on year, with the exception of a small 
increase in convergence during 1986-8.  
 
In addition, there has been a significant concentration in the ‘market’ for 
international students over time. Hence, increasing numbers of HEIs were to be 
found at the lower end of the distribution, with relatively fewer international 
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students attending their courses, whilst a decreasing number of HEIs were 
clustered at the higher end of the distribution, with relatively larger numbers of 
international students. An analogous stratification has occurred in terms of the 
revenue accruing to different HEIs from international students’ fees, at least until 
the late 1990s.  
 
It is possible that some more elite universities, such as those within the ‘Russell 
Group’, may have anticipated the possible benefits of the fees, and that this was 
reflected in their response to the new policy- although such HEIs, as suggested by 
Table 1, varied in the degree to which they benefited from the new fees. Most 
HEIs were publicly critical of the predicted effects of full-cost fees on their 
existing international student intake, and all HEI sectoral associations opposed 
the policy, with the then Chairman of the CVCP maintaining that universities 
were ‘unanimous’ in opposing the plans (Education, Science and Arts 
Committee, 1980, p.92; see also Williams, 1981, p.225). 
 
However, HEIs adopted a variety of responses to the full-cost fees policy, ranging 
from outright opposition to disagreement with particular details. Manchester 
University, as noted above, was apparently the only university which attempted to 
subvert the new fee system, by giving international students an extended deadline 
for payment (THES, 16.11.79a). There was a certain amount of intra-sectoral 
conflict concerning the consequences of the new fees, with the Vice-Chancellor 
of London University being particularly keen to criticise polytechnics, which he 
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claimed were ‘benefiting unfairly out of fees’ (THES, 16.11.79b), and to warn 
that universities of lesser prestige than his own might reduce admissions 
standards to gain more fee revenue (David, 1979).  
 
In contrast, a number of prominent, Russell Group Universities expressed 
outright opposition to the bidding system from the start, and made clear that they 
would bid only at the guide prices. Hence, the Vice-Chancellor of Bristol 
University stated that ‘Universities have to say they won’t do it’ (THES, 
20.10.89), and Lord Flowers, Vice-Chancellor of London University, made clear 
most colleges of the University would bid only at the guide prices (THES, 
19.1.90).  
 
However, as can be seen from Table 2 below, despite their public opposition to 
the policy, some Russell Group universities were amongst those HEIs which bid 
below guide prices, even if few apart from the University of Liverpool 
participated in the new scheme as wholeheartedly as the generally more 
enthusiastic newer universities.  
 
[Table 2 here]  
 
Overall, it appears that the strategic position of those universities which 
supported, or at least, did not actively attempt to disrupt, the development of 
competition may have had some impact on the extent to which markets 
subsequently developed. It would be difficult however to make any more 
substantial claims, for example concerning the required ‘degree of authority’ 
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possessed by supportive universities in order for a nascent market institution to 
develop and be consolidated- and how this might be researched.  
 
In addition, as Paul Pierson has noted, it is important to guard against 
functionalist explanations of institutional development which suggest that 
supporters of the creation of new institutions are motivated by knowledge of their 
effects (2000). As with the previous two models, this apparently intuitive 
explanation is also subject to possible pitfalls.  
 
Assessing explanations for liberalisation 
 
As the previous discussion indicates, none of the approaches investigated here 
offer a sufficient explanation for change and/or stasis in the cases concerned.  
 
The particular rules used during attempts to create markets did seem to have some 
impact on the extent to which competition was generalised across the sector, with 
the setting of a relatively realistic ‘guide price’ in particular being seen by some 
commentators as leading ‘logically’ to the development of a cartel. However, in 
the absence of a counter-example where such a guide price had not been set, it 
seems difficult to allocate primary causal efficacy to this factor.  
 
Similarly, without evidence of whether any threshold was antecedently defined 
by policy-makers, the setting of a ‘tipping point’ beyond which institutional 
change occurs appears to offer only a limited explanation.  
 28
 
The final explanation appears to offer us some purchase on the case at hand, since 
the more traditionally powerful Russell Group HEIs did appear to lobby strongly 
against the introduction of the bidding system, although a small number still bid 
under the guide price. More powerful HEIs may have believed they would benefit 
from the full-cost fees system, and not from the bidding system, whether or not 
this was likely to match reality.  
 
This analysis indicates the need for more careful scholarship concerning the 
mechanisms underlying liberalisation- in particular, the need for a focus on both 
institutions and actors when explaining the introduction and generalisation of 
competition. Such an analysis should consider the parameters for liberalisation set 
by governments, the number of actors supporting liberalisation, and the dynamics 
of the relationship between these actors.  
 
This approach is necessary in order to move beyond mechanistic approaches to 
liberalisation as counselled by Marginson and Rhoades (2002). Liberalisation 
need not necessarily arise organically and naturally. Rather, governments often 
attempt to shape the parameters for markets, and actors can either accept or reject 
new institutional norms (Fligstein, 1992: 358-9). As such, it is important not to 
place a hard and fast line between institutional frameworks on the one hand, and 
the behaviour they engender or shape, on the other. Institutions not only privilege 
the interests of certain groups or others, by ‘mobilising bias’; they also often 
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embody compromises between different powerful actors, which can make them 
inherently unstable (Mahoney and Thelen, 2010). More detailed analysis is 
required of the interactive, and indeed, sometimes, constitutive, relationship 
between powerful actors and the institutional contexts within which they operate. 
Such an approach offers a more plausible and subtle means of uncovering and 
explaining the mechanisms of liberalization.  
 
 
Conclusion 
This article has examined two cases of attempts to create markets. As both cases 
were drawn from the British higher education sector and occurred during a 
similar time period - indeed, under the same Government- , this comparison 
should allow the isolation of factors which promoted the development of a market 
in one case and not in the other. Three explanations for the institutionalisation of 
liberalisation were considered here: the alteration of ‘logics of action’, the 
breaching of a threshold, and the gaining of support from strategically important 
actors for a new, market-based, institutional arrangement. The article concluded 
that none of these approaches offered a sufficient explanation of the differential 
progress of liberalisation. It did, however, underline the importance of 
considering the relationship between powerful actors and the institutional 
contexts within which they operate. It thus challenges those accounts which 
portray liberalisation as an ‘inevitable’ process.  
 
In summary, there is a pressing need for additional scholarship to uncover the 
precise mechanisms under which new institutional arrangements arise and are 
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sustained over time. In particular, the analysis of these two cases suggests the 
need for a focus on both institutions and actors, and the reflexive relationship 
between them, when explaining the introduction and generalisation of 
competition. It should be noted, however, that whilst the focus of this article on 
one sector in one national context has facilitated the isolation of relevant 
explanatory factors, the specificities of this case should be born in mind before 
applying any of its conclusions to other cases.  
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Table 1: Change in the fee per international student, from 1979 to 20046 
 
Higher Education Institution- University of… unless 
otherwise stated 
Chge FPS, in 
thousands  
Russell group? 
Birmingham 4.27 yes 
St Andrews 5.44 no 
Warwick 5.60 yes 
Uni. College of North Wales- Bangor* 5.66 no 
Salford University 5.69 no 
Oxford 5.77 yes 
Keele 5.87 no 
University College of Wales Cardiff* 6.12 yes 
Bradford 6.14 no 
Essex 6.16 no 
Loughbourgh Institute of Technology * 6.73 no 
Hull 6.89 no 
York 6.91 no 
Newcastle Upon Tyne 7.03 yes 
University College Swansea* 7.16 no 
Stirling 7.17 no 
Reading 7.21 no 
Kent at Canterbury 7.35 no 
City University 7.44 no 
Sussex 7.50 no 
Cambridge 7.60 yes 
Uni. College of Wales Aberystwyth* 7.61 no 
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Exeter 7.65 no 
Sheffield 7.72 yes 
Dundee 7.72 no 
St David’s College* 7.73 no 
Manchester University 7.85 yes 
Manchester Inst of Tech. 7.91 no 
East Anglia 7.92 no 
Southampton 8.00 yes 
Lancaster 8.09 no 
Nottingham 8.15 yes 
Bristol 8.33 yes 
Leeds 8.52 yes 
Aston 8.73 no 
Aberdeen 8.77 no 
Liverpool 8.91 yes 
Glasgow 8.96 yes 
Surrey 9.08 no 
Edinburgh 9.41 yes 
Brunel University 9.49 no 
Durham 9.53 no 
Bath 9.82 no 
Herriot Watt University 9.93 no 
Strathclyde 10.42 no 
Leicester 11.54 no 
 
 
Notes: This table is based on HESA statistics covering the forty-six HEIs which 
had continued with a roughly similar structure and identity throughout the period 
1979-2005, and for whom there were no significant data errors. The change in 
Fee Per Student is given in 2004 £s, discounted for inflation (using ONS 
measures of inflation, rounded up from .5). The Fee Per Student was calculated 
by dividing the amount of institutional income derived from ‘other’ fees by the 
number of ‘overseas students’ (as classified in USS statistics) and ‘full-time 
equivalent overseas students’ (from HESA statistics), and is therefore not an 
exact measure. For starred institutions (*), the original institutional name is used.  
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Table 2: The extent to which universities bid below the UFC’s guide price: 
the costs of students offered by universities, as a percentage of what costs 
would have been if pegged at the guide price9 
  
Higher Education Institution- University of… unless 
otherwise stated 
Offered cost as a 
percentage of guide 
price cost 
Russell group? 
St David’s College* 93.6 no 
Leicester 96.1 no 
UCWM 96.8 no 
Liverpool 97.1 yes 
City University 97.5 no 
St Andrews 97.6 no 
Stirling 97.6 no 
Sussex 97.7 no 
Hull 98.2 no 
Sheffield 98.4 yes 
Uni. College of Wales Aberystwyth* 98.5 no 
University College of Wales Cardiff* 98.5 yes 
Durham 98.6 no 
Uni. College of North Wales- Bangor* 98.7 no 
Anglia 98.8 no 
Salford University 98.8 no 
York 98.8 no 
 Edinburgh 98.9 yes 
Lancaster 99.0 no 
Exeter 99.1 no 
Keele 99.1 no 
Manchester Inst of Tech. 99.1 no 
Nottingham 99.1 yes 
Newcastle Upon Tyne 99.3 yes 
Aberdeen 99.3 no 
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Glasgow 99.3 yes 
Strathclyde 99.3 no 
Kent at Canterbury 99.4 no 
Warwick 99.4 yes 
Bradford 99.6 no 
Southampton 99.6 yes 
Birmingham 99.7 yes 
Leeds 99.7 yes 
Dundee 99.7 no 
Bath 99.8 no 
Loughbourgh Institute of Technology * 99.8 no 
Essex 99.9 no 
Reading 99.9 no 
Aston  100 no 
Bristol 100 yes 
Brunel University 100 no 
Cambridge 100 yes 
Manchester University 100 yes 
Oxford 100 yes 
Surrey 100 no 
University College Swansea* 100 no 
Herriot Watt University 100 no 
London Business School 100 no 
Manchester Business School 100 no 
 
 
Notes: Table is based on statistics reported in the UFC’s records (UFC, 12.9.90). 
For ease of exposition, the University of London has not been included in this 
table, as the vast majority of its colleges stuck to the guide price for all subjects. 
For starred institutions, the original institutional name is used, to prevent 
confusion due to mergers or changes in names.  
 
 
 
